Poisoning attacks have emerged as a significant security threat to machine learning (ML) algorithms. It has been demonstrated that adversaries who make small changes to the training set, such as adding specially crafted data points, can hurt the performance of the output model. Most of these attacks require the full knowledge of training data or the underlying data distribution. In this paper we study the power of oblivious adversaries who do not have any information about the training set. We show a separation between oblivious and full-information poisoning adversaries. Specifically, we construct a sparse linear regression problem for which LASSO estimator is robust against oblivious adversaries whose goal is to add a non-relevant features to the model with certain poisoning budget. On the other hand, non-oblivious adversaries, with the same budget, can craft poisoning examples based on the rest of the training data and successfully add non-relevant features to the model.
Main question: are full-information attacks stronger? Motivated by understanding the role of the knowledge about the data set by a poisoning adversary, in this work, we directly study whether having full information can help a poisoning attacker. Namely, we study whether there is a learning task in which oblivious poisoning adversaries who might only know the trained model θ (but not the entire training data S that has led to θ) are provably weaker than full-information adversaries who know the entire data set S (in addition to perhaps knowing the model θ).
A new motivation for privacy. Privacy is often viewed as a utility for data owners in the machine learning pipeline. Due to the trade-offs between privacy and the utility of the users, data users sometimes ignore the privacy of data owners while doing their analysis, specially when they do not have any incentive to preserve the privacy. A positive answer to the main question posed above could create a new motivation for keeping training dataset private. Specifically, the users of data would try to keep training dataset private, with the goal of securing their models against poisoning and increasing their own utility.
Our Contribution
In this work, we initiate a formal study of the role of adversary's knowledge in poisoning attacks by comparing the two extreme points: full information vs. oblivious attacks. In particular, we study the provable difference that it makes when the adversary knows all of the training data before launching the poisoning attack, called the full-information threat model, in contrast to when the adversary adds malicious data to the training set in an oblivious way.
We prove our separation between the power of the two poisoning adversarial models through a novel study of poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery, and specifically for a sparse linear regression problem. In a model recovery problem, the learning algorithm wants to discover the relevant features that determine the ground truth function. For example, imagine a dataset of patients with many features, who suffer from an specific disease with different levels of severity. One can try to find the most important features contributing to the severity of disease in the context of model recovery. Specifically, the learners' goal here is to recover a vector θ * ∈ R p whose non-zero coordinates determine the relevant features contributing to the disease. In this scenario, the goal of the adversary is to deceit the learning process and make it output a modelθ ′ ∈ R p with a different set of non-zero coordinates.
As motivation for studying model recovery under adversarial perturbations, note that the non-zero coordinates of the learned modelθ (denoted byθ ′ , in case of an attacker being involved) could define a sensitive information. For example, in the patient data example, the adversary might be a pharmaceutical institute who tries to imply that a non-relevant feature is contributing to the disease, in order to advertise for a specific medicine. To the best of our knowledge, all previous poisoning attacks were studied in settings where the goal of the adversary was to increase the population risk or the probability of a bad property (e.g., failing on a particular test example in the context of targeted poisoning). Therefore, studying poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery is also a novel contribution of our investigation.
More specifically, we construct a (regression) model recovery problem in which a matrix X ∈ R n×p that consists of n examples of dimension p are linearly mapped to p real numbers Y = X × θ * + W where θ * is the ground truth and W is Gaussian noise. We study full-information vs. oblivious attackers against Lasso, where the model is simply the output to the following optimization problem:
where λ is Lasso's parameter. We show that by choosing λ and the distribution of the (rows of) X appropriately, the following could be proved for the two types of poisoning adversaries. There is a fullinformation poisoning adversary who adds a single row to X and makes θ ′ contain a non-zero coordinate in an arbitrary location (chosen by the adversary). On the other hand, any oblivious adversary with "budget" o( √ n) who adds an arbitrary set of o( √ n) rows to X, only based on the knowledge ofθ, is unable to change the support set of the re-trained model θ ′ based on the poisoned data set. Note that, it is even natural to consider oblivious attacks that do not know the original honestly recovered modelθ, and giving this knowledge to an oblivious attack (and yet proving its limit) only makes our results stronger.
Related Work
As opposed to data poisoning setting, the question of adversary's knowledge is previously studied in the line of work on adversarial examples. In a test time evasion attack the adversary's goal is to find an adversarial example, the adversary knows the input x fully before trying to find a close input x ′ x that is misclassified. In that setting, the question of adversary's knowledge can be formed around whether or not it knows the model θ completely or it only has a black-box access to it (Papernot et al., 2017) . Note that, in our work, the model θ is known to the adversary, and the information complexity of the attack focuses on whether or not the adversary is aware of the full training data. Some previous work have studied poisoning attacks in the setting of federated/distributed learning (Bhagoji et al., 2019; Mahloujifar et al., 2019b) . Their attacks, however, either (implicitly) assume a full (or partial) information attacker, or aim to increase the population risk (as opposed to injecting features in a model recovery task). Thus, our work is novel in both formally studying the differences between full-information vs. oblivious attacks, and tackling it in the context of model recovery.
We also distinguish our work with another line of work that studies the computational complexity of the attacker (Mahloujifar & Mahmoody, 2018; Garg et al., 2019) . Here, we study the "information complexity" of the attack; namely, what information the attacker needs to succeed in a poisoning attack, while those works study the computational resources that a poisoning attacker needs to successfully degrade the quality of the learned model. Another recent exciting line of work that studies the computational aspect of robust learning in poisoning contexts, focuses on the computational complexity of the learning process itself (Charikar et al., 2017; Diakonikolas et al., 2017 Diakonikolas et al., , 2018b Prasad et al., 2018; Diakonikolas et al., 2018c) , and other works have studied the same question about the complexity of the learning process for evasion attacks (Bubeck et al., 2018b,a; Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan, 2019) .
Finally, we remark that online poisoning adversaries studied in Mahloujifar & Mahmoody (2017) ; Wang & Chaudhuri (2018) ; , roughly speaking, is a form of attack that lies somewhere between oblivious and full-information attacks. In their model, an online adversary needs to choose its decision about the i th example (i.e., to tamper or not tamper it) based only on the history of the first i − 1 examples, and without the knowledge of the future examples. So, their knowledge about the training data is limited, in a partial way. Since we separate the power of full information vs. oblivious attacks, a corollary of our results is that at least one of these models is different from the online variant for recovering sparse linear regression. In other words, we are in one of the following worlds: (i) online adversaries are provably stronger than oblivious adversaries or (ii) full-information (offline) adversaries are provably stronger than online adversaries.
Organization. In Section 2, we give the basic definitions of the problem setting in the model recovery with Lasso estimator. In Section 3, we present the formal threat models of poisoning attacks in the fullinformation and oblivious settings in the context of model recovery with Lasso estimator. In Section 4, we formally prove our separation between the two threat models by proving the power of full-information attacks and limits on the power of oblivious attacks with the same tampering budget. In Section 5, we end with some concluding remarks and discussion of future work.
Model Recovery with Lasso Estimator
Notation. For an arbitrary vector θ ∈ R p we use Supp(θ) = {i : θ i = 0}, we denote the set of (indices of) its non-zero coordinates of θ ∈ R p . We also use θ 2 and θ to denote the ℓ 2 ℓ 1 norm of θ respectively. For two matrices X ∈ R n×p and Y ∈ R n×1 , we use X Y ∈ R n×(p+1) to denote a set of n regression observations on feature vectors X i∈ [n] such that Y i is the real-valued observation for X i . For two matrices X 1 ∈ R n 1 ×p and X 2 ∈ R n 2 ×p , we use X 1 X 2 ∈ R (n 1 +n 2 )×p to denote the concatenation of X 1 and X 2 . Similarly, for two set of observations
Problem setting. We work in the model recovery setting, and the exact format of our problem is as follows. There is a target parameter vector θ * ∈ (0, 1) p . We have a n × p matrix X (n vectors, each of p features) and we have Y = X × θ * + W where W itself is a small noise, and Y is the vector of noisy observations about θ * . Number of non-zero elements (denoting the actual relevant features) in θ * are bounded by s namely, Supp(θ * ) ≤ s. For the setting of the problem mentioned above, the Lasso Estimator tries to learn θ * by optimizing the a penalized loss and obtain the solutionθ as follows.
We use Lasso( X Y ) to denoteθ, as learned by the Lasso optimization described above. We also use ℓoss(θ, X Y ) to denote the "scaled up" value of the Lasso's loss
It is known (Wainwright, 2009) , as described in the following theorem, that the Lasso estimator with proper parameters provably finds the correct set of features, if the dataset and noise vectors are sampled from normal distributions.
Theorem 2.1 (Wainwright (2009) ). Let X be a dataset sampled from N (0, 1/4) n×p and W be a noise vector sampled from N (0, σ 2 ) n . For any θ * ∈ (0, 1) p with at most s number of non-zero coordinates, for λ = 4σ n × log(p) and n = ω(s · log(p)), with probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X and W (that determine Y as well) we have Supp(θ) = Supp(θ * ) whereθ = Lasso( X Y ). Moreover,θ is a unique minimizer for ℓoss(·, X Y ).
The above theorem requires the dataset to be sampled from a certain distribution and does not take into account the possibilities of outliers in the data. The robust version of this theorem, where part of the training data is chosen by an adversary, is also studied in the context of differential privacy. The following theorem by Thakurta & Smith (2013) states that if an adversary changes up toÕ( √ n) of the examples, the Lasso estimator still finds the right set of coordinates with high probability.
Theorem 2.2 (Thakurta & Smith (2013) ). Let X be a dataset sampled from N (0, 1/4) n×p and W be a noise vector sampled from N (0, σ 2 ) n . For any θ * ∈ (0, 1) p , if λ = 4σ n × log(p) and n = ω(s log(p) + s 4 · k 2 ), with probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X, W (determining Y ), and Y = X × θ * + W it holds that, adding any set of k labeled vectors X ′ Y ′ , such that rows of X ′ has ℓ ∞ norm at most 1 and Y has ℓ ∞ norm at most s, to X Y would not change the support set of the model recovered by Lasso estimator. Namely,
More general version of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are provided in the appendix. Theorem A.2 which is a generalization of Theorem 2.1, specifies some sufficient conditions for a dataset X that will make Lasso estimator to find the correct features. Similarly, Theorem 2.2 is a generalization of Theorem A.2 that shows sufficient conditions for X that will make Lasso estimator to find the correct features in a robust way. Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are instantiating of these generalized theorems for normal distribution and are proved by showing that the sufficient conditions will happen with high probability.
Oblivious and Full-information Poisoning: Defining Threat Models
In this section, we formally define the security of model recovery under poisoning attacks. It is common in cryptography to define security model based on a game between an adversary and a challenger (Katz & Lindell, 2007) . Here, we use the same approach and introduce two game based definitions for oblivious and full-information adversaries. The definitions are tailored for model recovery setting and Lasso, but they could be directly generalized to other learners as well. Later, in Section 4 we will see how to construct a problem that separates these two definitions and show that oblivious attacks are provably weaker. The following game captures the security of model recovery against oblivious poisoning adversaries who have to select poison examples based only on the knowledge of the model trained on the honestly sampled (but still noisy) data.
Definition 3.1 (Oblivious poisoning). The game is between a challenger C and an adversary A.
OblivGame(k, X Y ): 1. C recovers modelθ = Lasso( X Y ) and sends it to the adversary A.
Adversary
and sends it to the adversary.
Adversary wins if Supp
Remark 3.2 (Variations of threat model). In Definition 3.1, Since we are focusing on oblivious setting, we only allow the adversary to add malicious data. One can, however, define more specific goals for the attacker to violate the model recovery, by specifically aiming to add, or remove, non-zero coordinates to the recovered model compared to the ground truth. Such adversaries can be seen as "targeted" variants of the adversary of Definition 3.1, and even more targeted variants could be envisioned where specific features are aimed to be added to or dropped from the recovered model. Generally, the winning condition for the adversary could be any predicate over the resulting model. On the other direction, one can directly obtain more general definitions compared to Definition 3.1, by allowing more general problems of model recovery and even study oblivious attacks for other type of learning problems beyond model recovery.
We now define a more powerful poisoning adversary who gets to see the whole dataset and then crafts the poisoning points based on the "clean points" in the dataset. We call this strong adversarial model the full-information model which is defined in the following game.
Definition 3.3 (Full-information poisoning). The following game is between a challenger C and an adversary A. (The different part compared to Definition 3.1 is denoted by purple color.) 
Separating the Power of Oblivious and Full-information Poisoning
In this section, we will provably demonstrate that the power of oblivious and full-information adversaries could significantly differ. More specifically, we construct a model recovery problem (by specifying the distribution of its components) such that, with high probability, it stays secure in the oblivious attack model of Definition 3.1, while the same problem's setting is highly vulnerable to poisoning adversaries as defined in the full-information threat model of Definition 3.3.
Main idea behind construction: To prove the separation, we use the fact that oblivious adversaries cannot discriminate between the coordinates that are not in the support set of θ * . Specifically, if there is a single unstable coordinate i ∈ Supp(θ * ) that can be attacked with small number of poisoning points, because of excessively noisy values in dataset, then the oblivious adversary would not be able to find this coordinate simply because he does not see the dataset. Therefore he should attack blindly and pick one of the coordinates at random. On the other hand, the full-information adversary can investigate the dataset and find the unstable feature.
In the rest of the section, we first show two properties of a dataset X Y that if hold, we can prove separation. Then we will show how to instantiate a dataset with those two properties by changing a dataset that is sampled from a Gaussian distribution. The first notion divides the columns of data to stable and unstable features based on the number of poisoning points required to remove or add those features from or to the support set of the resulting model.
Definition 4.1 (Stable and unstable coordinates). Consider a dataset X Y ∈ R n×(p+1) with a unique solution for the Lasso minimization. X Y is k-unstable on coordinate i ∈ [p] if its i th coordinate of model learn on it is 0, namely Lasso X Y i = 0 and there exist a data set X ′ Y ′ with size k and ℓ 1 norm at most 1 on each row such that
On the other hand, X Y is k-stable on a coordinate i, if for all datasets X ′ Y ′ with k rows and ℓ 1 norm at most 1 on each row we either have
Now we show how to use a dataset with only one k-unstable feature and prove the separation. The core idea is to shuffle the columns and prevent the adversary from finding the unstable coordinate. The adversary who does not know which of the coordinates is unstable cannot perform the attack but an adversary with the knowledge of the unstable coordinate can add poisoning points and cause the unstable coordinate to be added to the support set. The following definition captures the property of a dataset that adding the unstable feature is hard unless the adversary knows which feature is unstable.
Definition 4.2 ((k, ǫ)-resilience). Consider a dataset X Y ∈ R n×(p+1) with a unique solution for the Lasso minimization and let T = Supp(Lasso( X Y )). Also, let G be the set of all permutations that are fixed on T namely, G = {π : [p] → [p] | ∀i ∈ T ; π(i) = i}. We say X Y is (k, ǫ)-resilient if for any dataset X ′ Y ′ with k rows with ℓ 1 norm at most 1, we have
where π(X ′ ) is the matrix produced by permuting the columns of X ′ according to π.
Now we state and prove the following theorem that separates the notion of oblivious and fullinformation poisoning attacks. This theorem assumes the existence of a (k, ǫ)-resilient dataset that is k-stable on all but one feature.
Theorem 4.3 (Separating oblivious and full-information adversaries). Consider a dataset X Y that is (k, ǫ)-resilient and k-stable on all the coordinates except on 1 coordinate that is k-unstable. Suppose the challenger takes this dataset and randomly shuffles the coordinates according to a permutation π to get π(X) and uses the dataset π(X) Y to run the Lasso estimator. Then, the probability of winning for an oblivious adversary in the security game of Definition 3.1 is at most ǫ, while a full-information adversary can win the security game of Definition 3.3 with probability 1.
Remark 4.4. Note that in Theorem 4.5 the full information adversary is an "information-theoretic" adversary. In particular, the the theorem states that the full-information adversary has all the information that is required to find the unstable coordinate and also the poisoning dataset that would result in adding the unstable coordinate. Finding the right set of poisoning examples might be computationally hard but that is not an issue since we are dealing with information theoretic adversaries. Specifically, since we do not put any restriction on time complexity, all the adversary has to do is to try all possible combinations of poisoning datasets and find the one that will add the unstable coordinate to the model. However, for Construction 4.6 in next section, we not require the full-information adversary to be computationally unbounded and its running time is O(p).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We first show that winning the full-information game of Definition 3.3 is always possible. After getting the dataset X Y the adversary inspects the dataset to find out which coordinate is unstable and find a poisoning dataset that would add that unstable coordinate to the support set of the model. Now we show that no adversary can win the oblivious security game of Definition 3.1 with probability more than ǫ. The intuition behind this claim is the symmetric nature of the Lasso estimator-by permuting the rows of a dataset X Y to π(X) Y the Lasso would output the same output with permuted coordinates. Namely, Lasso( π(X) Y ) = π(Lasso( X Y )).
Now, let π be the permutation chosen by the challenger and letθ = Lasso( X Y ) and let T = Supp(θ). Adversary receives π(θ) and generates a poisoning dataset X ′ Y ′ . Let A(π(θ)) denote the potentially randomized algorithm that the adversary uses to generate the poison data, and let G = {π : [p] → [p] | ∀i ∈ T ; π(i) = i}. Now we use (k, ǫ)-resiliency of X Y to argue about the probability of an oblivious adversary winning the game. The high level idea is that because the oblivious adversary cannot discriminate between zero coordinates, he cannot find the right ordering of coordinates with a high probability.
Pr
Therefore, the proof of Theorem 4.3 is complete.
Constructing the Dataset
Now we move on to constructing a dataset that is k-stable on all but one coordinate and is (k, ǫ)-resilient.
What values of k can we use? Before constructing the dataset, lets first see what values of k we can use to prove separation. The following theorem states that if k > ω(λ) even an oblivious adversary can add any non-relevant feature to the support set of resulting model. Therefore, in our separation, we are interested in values of k = o(λ) as we know for k = ω(λ) both the oblivious and full-information adversaries have almost full advantage.
Theorem 4.5. Let X ∈ R n×p be an arbitrary matrix, θ * ∈ [0, 1] p be an arbitrary vector, W be a noise vector sampled from N (0, σ 2 ) n×1 , and let Y = X × θ * + W . Also let λ be the penalty parameter that is used for Lasso. For any i ∈ [p], there is an oblivious adversary that adds k = 2λ labeled examples X ′ Y ′ with ℓ 1 norm at most 1 such that
Theorem 4.5 shows that there are oblivious adversaries that use budget 2λ and add non-relevant features to the model independent of what distribution the dataset is sampled from. On the other hand, based on Theorem 2.2 we know that if the data is sampled from Gaussian distribution, for λ = O( √ n), the Lasso estimator is robust against full-information adversaries with budget O( √ n). Theorem 4.5 which shows the almost tightness of the robustness bounds of Theorem 2.2 makes Gaussian distribution not suitable for separating full-information and oblivious adversaries. Following, we show that by tweaking the Gaussian distribution we can achieve the separation.
Construction 4.6. Consider a vector θ * ∈ R p with first s coordinates having non-zero values and last p − s coordinates are equal to 0. Let λ = 4σ √ n × p and k < λ such that n ≥ s · log(p) + s 4 · k 2 . We construct a dataset
where X 0 is generated by first sampling from N (0, 1/4) n×p and setting the last coordinate to 0. Namely
for W is the noise vector sampled from N (0, σ 2 ) n . X 1 ∈ R (λ−k)×p whose all elements are equal to 0 except the last coordinate that 1 and Y 1 is a vector that is equal to 1 everywhere. Namely,
Now we prove that the dataset of Construction 4.6 has all the required properties of Theorem 4.5. First show that Lasso estimator can recover θ * from the dataset X Y of Construction 4.6.
be the dataset of Construction 4.6. With probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X 0 and W in Construction 4.6, ℓoss(·, X Y ) has a unique minimizer and we have Supp(Lasso( X Y )) = Supp(θ * ).
In addition, we have Lasso( X Y )) = Lasso( X 0 Y 0 ). 
Note that in Claim 4.9, the value of q would be at most 1. This is because Lasso estimator would always output a modelθ in (0, 1) p . Moreover, since (X 0 , Y 0 ) is sampled from a Gaussian setting of Theorem distribution, q would be very close to max i∈[p] θ * i as well. This is because that is very close to θ * in ℓ 2 norm. Since θ * ∈ (0, 1) p and q cannot be much larger than 1, for large enough n.
Remark 4.10 (Generalization of Construction 4.6). In Construction 4.6, the feature matrix X 0 is sampled from Normal distribution. The reason behind this is because we need the sampled dataset to be suitable for Lasso estimator. In particular, based on Theorem 2.1 and 2.2, we know that sampling from Normal distribution would generate a "good" dataset for Lasso estimator to robustly recover the correct feature set, with high probability. The specifications of a "good" dataset for Lasso are explained in Theorems A.2 and A.2 in appendix. We can build the dataset of Construction 4.6 based on any feature matrix X 0 that satisfies these conditions. This means that sampling from Gaussian is not necessary and as long as X 0 is "good", one can prove the separation. Theorem 4.5, Claim 4.7, Claim 4.8 and Claim 4.9 We first state and prove the following useful lemma.
Proofs of
Lemma 4.11. Let X ∈ R n×p and Y ∈ R n . Letθ be a vector that minimizes ℓoss(·, X Y ). Then, for all non-zero coordinates j ∈ [p], whereθ j = 0 we have
and for all 0 coordinates j ∈ [p], where θ j = 0, we have
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.5 Sinceθ is a minimizer of f (·), the derivative of f should be 0 or undefined on all coordinates atθ. Note that, for all non-zero coordinates i the derivative of the second term 2λ θ 1 is equal to 2λ Sign(θ i ). Therefore, for non-zero coordinates the derivative of the first term should be equal to −2λ · Sign(θ i ). That is,
which proves the first part of the lemma. For the second part, note that the derivative of f does not exist, but the left-hand and right-hand derivatives exist andθ minimizes f . Therefore, the left-derivative should be negative and the right hand derivative should be positive. Thus, we have
finishing the proof of the lemma. Now, we prove Theorem 4.5 and show how to construct the poisoning dataset by using the lemma above.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Consider X ′ which is a k ×p matrix that is 0 everywhere except on the i th column that is 1 and Y ′ is a k × 1 vector that is equal to 1 everywhere. We show that by adding this matrix the adversary is able to add i th coordinate to the support set of theθ ′ = Lasso X Y X ′ Y ′ . To prove this, suppose the i th coordinate ofθ ′ is 0. Thus, we have
(1)
Now we prove thatθ ′ also minimizes the Lasso loss over X Y . This is because for any vector θ with i th coordinate 0, we have
Now, letθ be the minimizer of ℓoss(·, X Y ). We know thatθ is 0 on the i th coordinate. Therefore we have,
where the last inequality comes from the fact thatθ ′ minimizes the loss over
On the other hand, we know that
becauseθ minimizes ℓoss(·, X Y ). Inequalities 2 and 3 imply that
and thatθ ′ minimizes ℓoss(·, X Y ). Therefore, based on Lemma 4.11, since the i th coordinate ofθ ′ is zero we have
Combining Equations 1 and 4 we have
This, however, is a contradiction because of Lemma 4.11 and the fact that the i th coordinate is zero. Hence, the i th coordinate could not be 0 and the proof is complete.
Proof of Claim 4.7. We first prove the uniqueness property. Let X ′ 0 be the first p − 1 columns of X 0 . Suppose there are two solutionsθ 1 andθ 2 for Lasso on X Y . We show that X ′ 0 Y 0 has two solutions as well. We first observe that the last coordinates ofθ 1 andθ 2 should both be 0. This is because of the fact that for any θ, we have n i=1 X (i,p) · (Y i − θ , X i ) = |λ − k| < λ which by Lemma 4.11 implies that the last coordinate for any Lasso solution should be 0. Now letθ ′ 1 andθ ′ 2 be the first p − 1 coordinates ofθ 1 andθ 2 respectively. We show thatθ ′ 1 andθ ′ 2 both minimize ℓoss(·, X ′ 0 Y 0 ). We have
Similarly, we have
and they both minimize ℓoss(·, X ′ 0 Y 0 ). Now note that X ′ 0 Y 0 have all the properties of Theorem 2.1 and we have X ′ 0 Y 0 with probability at least 3/4 has a unique Lasso solution. Therefore, the Lasso solution for X Y is also unique with probability at least 3/4. Also note that this unique solution would have the correct support set as X ′ 0 Y 0 would have the correct support set based on Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Cliam 4.8. We first show the k-unstability of the last coordinate. Consider a poisoning dataset
We prove that p ∈ Lasso X Y X ′ Y ′ . Suppose this is not the case and we have zero p th corodinate
This is contradictory with Lemma 4.11 that states this value should be less than λ because the p th coordinate is 0. Therefore, the p th coordinate is in the support set. Now, we focus on proving the k-stability of all other coordinates. Suppose by adding a subset X ′ Y ′ to X Y and we get a modelθ ′ = Lasso X Y X ′ Y ′ that is non-zero on the i th coordinate for some p > i > s. The idea is to build a poisoning dataset X ′′ Y ′′ ∈ R k×p that when added to X 0 Y 0 causes the i th coordinate to be added to the support set. Let X ′′ be the same matrix as X ′ except the last column that is set to 0. Namely,
Note that if we prove this, the proof would be complete as we know that [X 0 , Y 0 ] is k-stable for all coordinates with probability at least 3/4 based on Theorem 2.2 (Note that similar to the proof of Claim 4.7, the fact that the last coordinate of X 0 is not sampled from Gaussian would not cause any issue). However, there is one subtle issue that might happen here, if the ℓ ∞ norm of Y ′′ might be larger than s, then the guarantee of theorem 2.2 does not hold anymore. But that will not happen because we restrict the ℓ ∞ norm of Y ′ to be at most 1 and the fact that ℓ ∞ norm ofθ ′ is at most 1 based on the way lasso estimator is defined. This means that the ℓ ∞ norm of Y ′′ is at most 2. Letθ ′′ ∈ R p be equal toθ ′ everywhere except on the last coordinate that is equal to 0. We have
Hence the proof is complete.
Proof of Claim 4.9. Suppose by adding a poisoning dataset X ′ Y ′ to X Y the p th coordinate would be added to the support of the solution. Namely,
Based on Lemma 4.11, we have
Based on the way the dataset is constructed, we have
Therefore by combining 5 and 6 we have
Now consider the quantity
. This is correct because otherwiseθ ′′ would have smaller loss thanθ ′ . By Claim 4.7 we know thatθ =θ ′′ which implies
On the other hand we have
Now by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
Combining inequalities 10, 7 and 9 we get
This means that the average of last coordinate of X ′ should have most of the weight of the whole matrix. In particular, since X ′
Also since each row in X ′ have ℓ 1 norm bounded by 1, we have
This implies that number of columns j for which
holds is at most (1 + q) 2 . Therefore, for any X ′ Y ′ the probability of π( X ′ Y ′ ) having sum at least k over the last column is at most (1 + q) 2 /(p − s). This means the probability of π(X ′ ) adding the p th column to the support set would be at most (1 + q 2 )/(p − s).
Conclusion
In this paper we initiated a formal study of the power of oblivious adversaries who do not have any information about the training set in comparison with full-information adversaries who know the training data completely before adding poison points to it. Our main result proved a separation between the two threat models by constructing a sparse linear regression problem for which Lasso estimator is robust against oblivious adversaries that aim to add a non-relevant features to the model with certain poisoning budget. On the other hand, for the same problem, we prove that full-information adversaries, with the same budget, can find specific poisoning examples based on the rest of the training data in such a way that they can successfully add non-relevant features to the model. Our work sheds light on an important and yet subtle aspect of modeling the threat posed by poisoning adversaries.
Another contribution of our work was to study poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery and for a sparse linear regression problem, where the goal of the adversary is something different from increasing the population risk (or failure probability on a particular example).
For future work, a general direction is to explicitly study other subtle aspects of poisoning attacks that are implicit in previous work. A specific direction is to study the power of oblivious poisoning attacks when the goal of the adversary is to increase the population risk or the probability of a bad event (i.e., targeted poisoning) as these are the most common goals of poisoning attacks studied in the literature. Specifically, consider a bad property B over the hypothesis class H, and a learning algorithm L : Z n → H. Does there exist a distribution D over Z n and a poisoning size p such that Finally, as discussed in the introduction, our results show that online adversaries who only know the training data till a particular point in time, fall somewhere between full information and oblivious attacks.
Can we formalize such attacks for model recovery and prove that they are more/less powerful than either of full information or oblivious settings?
A Sufficient Conditions for Model Recovery Using Lasso
In this section, we specify the sufficient conditions for a dataset that makes it a good dataset for robust recover using Lasso estimator. We borrow these specifications from the work of Thakurta & Smith (2013) .
Definition A.1 (Typical systems). Suppose θ * ∈ [0, 1] p be a model such that | Supp(θ * )| = s. Let X ∈ R n×p and Y ∈ R n×1 and W = Y − X × θ * . Also let X I ∈ R n×s be a matrix formed by columns of X whose indices are in Supp(θ * ) and X O ∈ R n×(p−s) be a matrix formed by columns of X whose indices are not in Supp(θ * ). The pair (θ * , X Y ) is called an (n, p, s, ψ, σ)-typical system, if the following hold:
• Column normalization: Each column of X has ℓ 2 norm bounded by √ n.
• Incoherence: ((X T O X I )(X T I X I ) −1 sign(θ * )) ∞ ≤ 1/4.
• Restricted strong restricted: The minimum eigenvalue of X I X T I is at least ψ.
• Bounded noise X T O (I n×n − X I (X T I X I ) −1 X T I )W ∞ ≤ 2σ n log(p).
The following theorem is a modified version of result of Wainwright (2009) borrowed from Thakurta & Smith (2013) .
Theorem A.2 (Model recovery with Lasso Wainwright (2009)). Let (θ * , X Y ) be a (n, p, s, σ, ψ)typical system. Let α = arg min i∈p max(θ * i , 1 − θ * i ). If n ≥ 16 · σ ψ·α s · log(p) and thenθ = Lasso( X Y ) would have the same support as θ * when λ = 4σ n · log(p).
The following theorem is about robust model recovery with Lasso in Thakurta & Smith (2013) .
Theorem A.3 (Robust model recovery with Lasso Thakurta & Smith (2013) ). Let (θ * , X Y ) be a (n, p, s, σ, ψ)-typical system. Let α = arg min i∈p max(θ * i , 1 − θ * i ). If n ≥ max( 16σ ψ · α s · log(p), 4s 4 k 2 (1/ψ + 1) 2 log(p)σ 2 ) thenθ = Lasso( X Y ) would have the same support as θ * when λ = 4σ n · log(p). In addition, adding any set of k labeled vectors X ′ Y ′ with ℓ ∞ norm at most 1 to X Y would not change the support set of the model recovered by Lasso estimator. Namely,
